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ABSTRACT 
Usable security has unique usability challenges because the need 
for security often means that standard human-computer-interaction 
approaches cannot be directly applied. An important usability goal 
for authentication systems is to support users in selecting better 
passwords, thus increasing security by expanding the effective 
password space. In click-based graphical passwords, poorly 
chosen passwords lead to the emergence of hotspots – portions of 
the image where users are more likely to select click-points, 
allowing attackers to mount more successful dictionary attacks. 
We use persuasion to influence user choice in click-based 
graphical passwords, encouraging users to select more random, 
and hence more secure, click-points. Our approach is to introduce 
persuasion to the Cued Click-Points graphical password scheme 
(Chiasson, van Oorschot, Biddle, 2007). Our resulting scheme 
significantly reduces hotspots while still maintaining its usability.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.5.2 [Interfaces and Representation]: User Interfaces – Graphical 
user interfaces; K.6.5 [Computing Milieux]: Security and 
Protection – Authentication. 
General Terms 
Design, Experimentation, Security, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Graphical passwords, persuasive technology, usable security. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
People select predictable passwords. This occurs with both text-
based and graphical passwords. Users tend to choose passwords 
that are memorable in some way, which unfortunately often means 
that the passwords tend to follow predictable patterns that are 
easier for attackers to exploit. While the predictability problem 
can be solved by disallowing user choice and assigning passwords 
to users, this usually leads to usability issues since users cannot 
easily remember such random passwords. 
An authentication system should encourage strong passwords 
while still maintaining memorability. We propose that users be 
persuaded to select more secure passwords. Our proposed system 
allows user choice while attempting to influence users to select 
stronger passwords. It also makes the task of selecting a weak 
password (easy for attackers to predict) more tedious, in order to 
discourage users from making such choices. In effect, our scheme 
makes choosing a more secure password the “path-of-least-
resistance”. Rather than increasing the burden on users, it is easier 
to follow the system’s suggestions and create a more secure 
password; a feature that is lacking in other schemes.  
We applied our approach to a click-based graphical password 
system and conducted an in-lab usability study with 39 
participants. Our results show that our Persuasive Cued Click-
Points scheme is effective at reducing the number of hotspots 
(areas of the image where users are more likely to select click-
points) while still maintaining usability. While we are not arguing 
that graphical passwords are the best approach to authentication, 
we find that they offer an excellent environment for exploring 
strategies for helping users select better passwords since it is easy 
to compare user choices. Indeed, we also mention how our 
approach might be adapted to text-based passwords. 
As an independent research contribution, we introduce and utilize 
a statistical approach for determining and comparing clustering in 
point patterns that arise in graphical passwords, by using spatial 
statistics typically used in earth sciences and biology.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We first 
discuss background literature on usable security, graphical 
passwords, and persuasive technology. Next we describe our 
Persuasive Cued Click-Points system and methodology for the 
usability study. Finally we provide analysis and discussion of the 
results. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Designing user interfaces for authentication systems, and security 
applications in general, raises some interesting challenges. While 
the area of usable security [6] can draw from existing HCI 
knowledge, some fundamental differences must be taken into 
account. The properties of security systems that set them apart 
include: 
- There is a second group of users, namely illegitimate users, 
who are actively trying to attack the system. Such attackers will 
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exploit any information leaked by, or that can be extracted 
through, the interface. They will also leverage any way that the 
system can be misused or any means to spoof the interface to 
trick legitimate users. This makes providing helpful feedback 
difficult, as it may also help attackers. 
- Security is typically a secondary task [28]; if it impedes users’ 
primary goals, users will often try to circumvent security. 
- Users have poor mental models of security [4, 28] and often 
misunderstand or underestimate the consequences of insecure 
actions. They may not even realise that their actions are 
insecure in the first place. 
- Computer security suffers from the “barn door” property [28]: 
if information or a system is exposed even for a brief time, 
there is no guarantee that it has not been compromised in an 
irrecoverable way. 
While these represent security concerns, they are all directly 
related to users of the system and as such, solutions must focus as 
much on the HCI aspects of the system as on the technical security 
components.  
For example, authentication schemes have both a theoretical and 
effective password space. The former space includes the set of all 
(theoretically) possible passwords. User choices tend to fall into a 
much smaller subset of the full password space, known as the 
effective password space. To illustrate, 4-digit PINs offer 10000 
possible combinations (0000 to 9999). However, some digit 
combinations are much more likely to be selected by users, such 
as years or patterns like 1234. Therefore, while the theoretical 
password space has a size of 10000, the effective password space 
is much smaller. We use PINs only to illustrate the concept of 
password spaces. As their small theoretical password space makes 
them inherently insecure, PINs are typically used in conjunction 
with a second authentication method such as providing an access 
card. 
An important security goal is to design a system that maximises 
the effective password space. Since the effective password space 
is determined by user behaviour, such a design involves usability 
as well. The resulting usability goal is that users must be 
encouraged to select more secure passwords without sacrificing 
the usability of the system. 
One of the challenges in measuring the effective password space is 
determining a proximity function (a measure of similarity between 
items). With text passwords, there is no single, obvious measure 
of what makes two passwords similar: Similar letters in the same 
positions? Common pet names or birthdays? Some other measure? 
Click-based graphical passwords however, have a natural 
proximity measure: the spatial distance between two points. As 
such, graphical passwords provide an excellent environment to 
explore and analyse user password choice, as well as approaches 
for enlarging the effective password space. 
Usable authentication is an active research area but no method has 
yet emerged as the ideal solution. Text passwords are the most 
popular method of authenticating users in computer systems, but 
these suffer from security and usability problems. Improvements 
such as mnemonic passwords [18] and passphrases [17] have had 
limited success as they also suffer from predictability problems or 
their security has not been sufficiently studied. Biometric 
authentication systems [15] have also been proposed but these 
have a number of usability issues and privacy implications. For 
example, if an account is compromised in some way, it can be 
difficult to issue a new biometric to a user. Furthermore, it is 
difficult for users to create distinct identities for various parts of 
their life. Other methods of authentication include the use of 
tokens, such as smart cards, but these may be forgotten or stolen.   
2.1. Click-based graphical passwords 
Graphical passwords offer an alternative to text-based passwords 
that is intended to be more memorable and usable because 
graphical passwords rely on our ability to more accurately 
remember images than text [20]. Several forms of graphical 
passwords have been proposed. Suo et al. [22] and Monrose and 
Reiter [19] offer overviews of various schemes and their design 
rationales. Of particular relevance is Jimini [23] where passwords 
are created by positioning a “template” over a background image 
so that the user’s secret areas fall within the cut-out portions of the 
template. They found that users had difficulty remembering the 
position of their template and selected similar areas of the images. 
We focus primarily on click-based graphical passwords. In 
PassPoints [29, 30], passwords consist of a sequence of five click-
points on a given image. Users may select any pixels in the image 
as click-points for their password. To log in, they repeat the 
sequence of clicks in the correct order. Each click must be within a 
system-defined tolerance region of the original click-point. The 
usability and security of this scheme was evaluated by the original 
authors [9, 29, 30] and subsequently by others [3, 16, 25]. It was 
found that although relatively usable, security concerns remain. 
The primary security problem is hotspots: different users tend to 
select similar click-points as part of their passwords. Attackers 
who gain knowledge of these hotspots through harvesting sample 
passwords or through automated image processing techniques can 
build attack dictionaries and more successfully guess PassPoints 
passwords [9, 25]. A dictionary attack consists of using a list of 
potential passwords (ideally in decreasing order of likelihood) and 
trying each on the system in turn to see if it leads to a correct login 
for a given account. Attacks can target a single account, or can try 
guessing passwords on a large number of accounts in hopes of 
breaking into any of them.  
To reduce the security impact of hotspots and further improve 
usability, we proposed an alternative click-based graphical 
password scheme called Cued Click-Points (CCP) [5]. Rather than 
 
Figure 1: A user’s navigation path through a sequence of 
images to form a password in CCP. Users click on one point 
per image and the current click-point determines the next 
image displayed. 
 
five click-points on one image, CCP uses one click-point on each 
of a sequence of five images. The next image displayed is 
determined by the location of the previously entered click-point 
(Figure 1). The claimed advantages are that logging on becomes a 
true cued-recall scenario, wherein seeing each image triggers the 
memory of a corresponding click-point. Thus remembering the 
order of the click-points is no longer a requirement on users, as the 
system presents the images one at a time. CCP also provides 
implicit feedback claimed to be useful only to legitimate users. 
When logging on, if users suddenly see an image they do not 
recognise, they know that their previous click-point was incorrect. 
However, to an attacker without knowledge of the correct 
password, this cue is meaningless. Hotspots are still reported [5] in 
CCP, but because a very large pool of images can be used (as 
opposed to a single image per user in PassPoints), attackers must 
perform proportionally more work to gain useful information. 
Visual attention research [31] shows that different people are 
attracted to the same predictable areas when looking at an image. 
This suggests that if users select their own click-based graphical 
passwords without guidance, hotspots will remain an issue. Davis 
et al. [7] suggest that user choice in all types of graphical 
passwords is unadvisable because users will always select 
predictable passwords. To the best of our knowledge, no research 
prior to the present paper exists on helping users select better 
graphical passwords, nor on how to avoid hotspots in click-based 
systems during password creation. 
2.2. Persuasive Technology 
Persuasive Technology was first articulated by Fogg [11] as using 
technology to motivate and influence people to behave in a desired 
manner. He discusses how interface cues can be designed to 
actively encourage users to perform certain tasks. Forget et al. [12] 
propose how these may be condensed into a set of core persuasive 
principles for computer security. 
An authentication system which applies Persuasive Technology 
should guide and encourage users to select stronger passwords, but 
not impose system-generated passwords. To be effective, the users 
must not ignore the persuasive elements and the resulting 
passwords must be memorable. As detailed in the next section, our 
proposed system accomplishes this by making the task of selecting 
a weak password more tedious and time-consuming. The path-of-
least resistance for users is to select a stronger password (not 
comprised entirely of known hotspots or following a predictable 
pattern). As a result, the system also has the advantage of 
minimizing the formation of hotspots across users since click-
points are more randomly distributed.   
3. PERSUASIVE CUED CLICK-POINTS 
(PCCP) 
Previous work [9, 16, 25] has shown that hotspots are a problem in 
click-based graphical passwords, leading to a reduced effective 
password space that facilitates more successful dictionary attacks. 
We investigated whether password choice could be influenced by 
persuading users to select more random click-points while still 
maintaining usability. Our goal was to encourage compliance by 
making the less secure task (i.e., choosing poor or weak 
passwords) more time-consuming and awkward. In effect, 
behaving securely became the path-of-least-resistance. 
Using CCP [5] as a base system, we added a persuasive feature to 
encourage users to select more secure passwords, and to make it 
more difficult to select passwords where all five click-points are 
hotspots. Specifically, when users created a password, the images 
were slightly shaded except for a randomly positioned viewport 
(see Figure 2). The viewport is positioned randomly rather than 
specifically to avoid known hotspots, since such information could 
be used by attackers to improve guesses and could also lead to the 
formation of new hotspots. The viewport’s size was intended to 
offer a variety of distinct points but still cover only an acceptably 
small fraction of all possible points. Users were required to select 
a click-point within this highlighted viewport and could not click 
outside of this viewport. If they were unwilling or unable to select 
a click-point in this region, they could press the “shuffle” button to 
randomly reposition the viewport. While users were allowed to 
shuffle as often as they wanted, this significantly slowed the 
password creation process. The viewport and shuffle buttons only 
appeared during password creation. During password confirmation 
and login, the images were displayed normally, without shading or 
the viewport and users were allowed to click anywhere.  
Our hypotheses were: 
1. Users will be less likely to select click-points that fall into 
known hotspots.  
2. The click-point distribution across users will be more 
randomly dispersed and will not form new hotspots. 
3. The login success rates will be similar to those of the original 
CCP system. 
4. Participants will feel that their passwords are more secure 
with PCCP than participants of the original CCP system. 
4. LAB STUDY 
The methodology for the usability study was reviewed and 
approved by our university’s ethics committee for psychological 
research. We tested Persuasive-CCP (PCCP) in a lab study with 
 
Figure 2: Screenshot of the PCCP Create Password 
interface with the viewport highlighting a portion of the 
image. (Pool image from [21]) 
 
   
39 participants who completed individual one-hour sessions. 
Participants ranged in age from 17 to 37. Most were university 
students from various fields. All were regular computer users who 
were comfortable with passwords and using a mouse. In total, data 
from 307 trials was collected. A trial consisted of a 5-step process 
that included creating, confirming, and logging on with a 
password. 
The PCCP system was implemented in J# and ran on a Windows-
based computer with a screen resolution of 1024x768. Consistent 
with previous PassPoints [3, 29, 30] and CCP [5] studies, the 
image dimensions were 451x331 pixels and the tolerance region 
was 19x19 pixels (the area around an original click-point accepted 
as correct since it is unrealistic to expect users to accurately target 
an exact pixel). We used the same set of 330 images as in the CCP 
study [5], including the 17-image subset used in the PassPoints lab 
study [3]. In our test system, the viewport was a 75x75 pixel 
square. System logs recorded the coordinates of the click-point on 
each image, the location of the viewport for each shuffle, and 
timestamps for each user action. 
We used a between-participants design, with all participants from 
this study assigned to the viewport condition. For comparison, we 
used data collected from previous studies [3, 5] where participants 
created passwords without the viewport. The methodology, 
including instructions to participants, questionnaires, equipment, 
software (other than the addition of the viewport), and images 
were identical to those used for CCP. Both studies were conducted 
by the same researchers. Data collected from CCP can therefore be 
used as a control group against which to measure the effects of the 
viewport in PCCP.   
Participants were first introduced to the system and told that they 
would be creating graphical passwords. They were further 
instructed to pretend these passwords were protecting their bank 
information, and thus should select passwords that were 
memorable but difficult for others to guess. They were told that 
the viewport was a tool to help them select more secure 
passwords, but that they could shuffle as many times as they 
wished to find a suitable click-point. Participants completed two 
practice trials (not included in the total count of 307 trials) to 
ensure that they understood how the graphical password system 
worked. They then proceeded to complete up to 10 further trials, 
as time allowed. A trial consisted of the following steps: 
1. Create a password: Users selected one click-point on each of 
five different images. They could use the shuffle button to 
move the viewport until they found a desired click-point. 
2. Confirm a password: Users re-entered their click-points. If 
they made an error, they could clear their clicks and try again. 
In cases where they absolutely did not know their password, 
they could reset, effectively returning to the first step. 
3. Answer two questions: Users answered two on-screen 
questions about their current password, providing their 
opinion of how easy it was to create a password and how 
difficult it would be to remember it in a week. 
4. Complete a Mental Rotations Test (MRT): Users spent at 
least thirty seconds completing an MRT puzzle [22]. This 
was primarily intended to simulate the passage of time and 
work as a distraction to clear visual working memory. 
5. Log in:  Users re-entered their password to log in. As with 
the Confirm phase, they could clear their click-points at any 
stage if they made a mistake or they could reset their entire 
password and return to the first step of the trial if they were 
unable to log in. If users were frustrated and could not use the 
given images, the interface allowed them to skip this trial and 
move to the next one. 
Users also completed two questionnaires: a demographics 
questionnaire at the midway point and a final post-task 
questionnaire to complete the hour-long session. 
5. DATA ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION 
To analyse PCCP’s performance, we compared the data from this 
user study to the following three datasets collected in previous 
studies [3, 5]: 
PassPoints-lab (PPLab):  43 participants tested a PassPoints 
system with 17 different images in a lab setting with the same 
methodology as this current study. At least 31 passwords (155 
click-points) were collected on each image. 
PassPoints-field (PPField): 376 participants used a PassPoints 
system for 7-9 weeks to access online notes for their class. Only 
the Pool (580 click-points) (Figure 3) and Cars (545 click-points) 
(Figure 4) images were used. These two images were selected 
from the set used in the PassPoints-lab study. 
Cued Click-Points (CCP): 57 participants tested a Cued Click-
Points system with the same set of 330 images and same 
methodology to this current study. 32 to 39 click-points were 
collected on each of the 17 core images from the PassPoints-lab 
study. Data was also collected on the remaining 313 images, but 
 
Figure 3: The Pool image [21] 
 
Figure 4: The Cars image [2] 
since these were randomly displayed and only a small subset was 
seen by each participant, limited data was available. 
We had the most data available for the two images used in the 
field study:  the Pool image (Figure 3) and the Cars image (Figure 
4). In most cases, the click-points collected in the PassPoints-field 
study will be used as the reference dataset since they were 
gathered in a realistic usage scenario and included the most 
samples. 
Our data analysis examines several aspects of the system in order 
to address each of our previously stated hypotheses. We first look 
at the general usability of PCCP, then focus on the issue of 
hotspots, and finally discuss users’ perception of the system. 
5.1. Success rates and timings 
As shown in Table 1, participants were able to successfully use 
PCCP. Success rates were calculated as the number of trials 
completed without errors or restarts, over all trials. As in earlier 
studies with click-based graphical passwords [3, 5], participants 
had some difficulty during confirmation while learning their 
password, but had little problem logging on afterwards. The 
success rates in Table 1 were calculated using the most stringent 
criteria: only passwords that were entered correctly on the first 
attempt without pressing the reset/clear button were considered 
successful. With a broader interpretation of “success”, there are 
only 3 instances (99% success) where users were unable to 
eventually log in correctly and had to create a new password.  
In comparison, CCP’s [5] reported confirmation and login success 
rates were 83% and 96% respectively. We suspect that PCCP 
participants had more difficulty initially learning their password 
because they were selecting click-points that were less obvious 
than those chosen by PassPoints and CCP participants. However, 
PCCP participants were ultimately able to remember their 
passwords with a little additional effort. The login success rates of 
CCP and PCCP are not significantly different (χ2(1,N=564)=0.07, 
p=.796)1, thus suggesting that the gain in security (reduced hot-
                                                                
1
 Results of the Chi-square (χ2) test and other tests of statistical 
significance used within this paper are considered statistically 
significant when p < .05, indicating that the groups being tested 
are different from each other with at least 95% probability. 
spotting, as shown in Section 5.3) was not at the expense of 
usability. 
Password creation was the longest of the three phases (Table 2). 
Users were progressively quicker with each re-entry. This is 
consistent with the pattern seen in the previous graphical password 
studies. We report the total time taken to complete a phase: from 
the time the first image was displayed to the time that they pressed 
the Login button, which included time spent thinking about their 
password. We also report the “click-time”: the time taken from the 
first click-point to the fifth click-point. This represents the time 
taken to actually enter their password. 
Table 1: PCCP success rates compared to CCP [5]  
 Create Confirm Login 
PCCP Success rate 305/307 
(99%) 
211/307 
(69%) 
278/307 
(91%) 
CCP Success rate 251/257 
(98%) 
213/257 
(83%) 
246/257 
(96%) 
Table 2: PCCP completion times for each phase (in seconds) 
 Create Confirm Login 
Total time: mean 50.7 29.9 16.2 
Total time: median 41.4 18.9 14.0 
Click-time: mean 36.3 24.9 10.6 
Click-time: median 28.5 11.6 7.8 
 
The CCP study [5] reports a median login click-time of 6.0 
seconds which is faster than PCCP’s 7.8 seconds. This difference 
is likely due to the slightly steeper learning curve from 
memorising a password that is not comprised of hotspots. 
However, PCCP participants did get progressively quicker and we 
speculate that comparable login times may be achievable with a 
few more login attempts. 
                                                                
2
 The heat map is included to illustrate how many of the CCP and 
PCCP click-points fall near or within known hotspots. 
 
 
Figure 5: Displays individual click-points from CPP and PCCP 
respectively for the Pool image. The base heat map shows the 
location of known hotspots derived for the PassPoints-field 
dataset and thus is identical on both plots. 2  
(Best viewed in colour). 
 
 
Figure 6: Displays individual click-points from CPP and 
PCCP respectively for the Cars image. The base heat map 
shows the location of known hotspots derived for the 
PassPoints-field dataset and thus is identical on both plots. 2 
(Best viewed in colour). 
 
   
5.2. Shuffles 
The shuffle button was used moderately during password creation 
(Table 3). 63% of trials had 5 or fewer shuffles across all 5 images 
within a password (i.e., an average of at most 1 shuffle per image). 
We found that users who shuffled a lot had higher login success 
rates than those who shuffled little but the difference was not 
statistically significant (t(305)=1.89, p = .06).  
Table 3: Effect of shuffles on success rates for 307 trials 
Shuffles # of trials Login Success Rate 
Low (0-5) 194 (63%) 89% 
High (>5) 113 (37%) 94% 
 
Most participants devised a shuffling strategy and used it 
throughout their session. They either consistently shuffled a lot at 
each trial or barely shuffled during the entire session. Those who 
barely shuffled selected their click-point by focusing on the 
section of the image displayed in the viewport, while those who 
shuffled a lot scanned the entire image, selected their click-point, 
and then proceeded to shuffle until the viewport reached that area. 
When questioned, participants who barely shuffled said they felt 
that the viewport made it easier to select a secure click-point. 
Those who shuffled a lot felt that the viewport hindered their 
ability to select the most obvious click-point on an image and that 
they had to shuffle repeatedly in order to reach this desired point. 
5.3. Hotspots 
The primary goal of PCCP was to increase the effective password 
space by guiding users to select more random passwords. To 
gauge our success, we therefore needed to determine whether 
PCCP click-points were more randomly distributed across the 
image and whether they successfully avoided known hotspots 
from previous studies. 
To begin our analysis, we represented the click-point data 
graphically on the images themselves. The PassPoints-field study 
involving the Pool and Cars images yielded a large volume of data 
about where users clicked. We used a Gaussian kernel smoothed 
intensity function to summarise this data for each image [8]. We 
then created heat maps to depict this summary on the image area, 
using several colour bands to represent varying intensities of click-
point concentration. The most intense areas thus correspond to 
hotspots. This heat-map of hotspots was used as the basis for 
comparing whether PCCP was better at avoiding known hotspots 
than CCP. 
Figure 5 shows the heat map for the PassPoints-field click-points 
on the Pool image. White areas are the least click-point intensive 
and cover most of the image area. The five colour bands from red 
to yellow indicate progressively more intense areas thus revealing 
severe hotspots. The figure shows the same heat map twice: on the 
left, overlaid with the individual click-points (shown as small 
circles) from the CCP study (34 click-points), and on the right for 
our PCCP study (35 click-points). Figure 6 shows the 
corresponding information for the Cars image. Visually, it appears 
that PCCP click-points are more randomly distributed across the 
image, and not as concentrated on the heat map hotspots. As 
described below, we further tested to see whether this was true by 
conducting a dictionary attack on the click-points and by 
conducting some spatial statistics tests which confirm that PCCP 
click-points are more randomly distributed on the images. 
To determine whether PCCP helped users avoid hotspots, we used 
the data from the earlier PassPoints-field study [3] to compile a list 
of hotspots for the Pool and Cars images. The PassPoints-field 
datasets included 580 click-points for Pool and 545 click-points 
for Cars. The hotspots were determined by finding the number of 
neighbouring click-points that were within tolerance of each click-
point, sorting in decreasing order on this number of neighbours, 
then greedily assigning each click-point to the largest hotspot for 
which it was within tolerance. The result was a list of hotspot 
coordinates sorted in decreasing order by number of click-points 
they encompass. 
We compared these hotspots to the click-points gathered for PCCP 
and CCP. Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the cumulative percentage 
of individual click-points that were “guessable” (i.e., the click-
point fell within tolerance of a hotspot) for the Pool and Cars 
images respectively. PCCP click-points were much less likely to 
fall within hotspots than CCP’s. For example, in the dataset for the 
Pool image (Figure 3) the 12 largest hotspots correctly identify 
40% of CCP click-points but only 8% for PCCP. It should be 
noted that these are individual click-points, not passwords. An 
attacker would need to correctly identify all five of a user’s click-
points and images in order to successfully guess a password.  For 
a more detailed discussion of security, see [5]. 
Due to the large set of images used in PCCP and CCP, we 
currently do not have hotspot information on all images and thus 
could not build an attack dictionary for entire passwords. 
 
 
Figure 7: Individual click-points “guessable” using hotspots 
from the PassPoints-field study on the Pool image 
 
 
Figure 8: Individual click-points “guessable” using hotspots 
from the PassPoints-field study for the Cars image 
 
However, we can use the same method used in the CCP study [5] 
as an estimate. For CPP, the top 30 hotspots on an image cover 
approximately 50% of click-points (see Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
Assuming that a password consists of 5 click-points, the 
probability that a given password is found in an attack dictionary 
built from these hotspots would be 0.55 = 3%. For PCCP, the top 
30 hotspots cover between 12% and 25% of click-points on the 
Pool and Cars images, so using an estimate of 20%, the 
probability that a password is in the same attack dictionary 
becomes 0.25 = 0.03%. 
Standard statistical methods were inappropriate for this analysis 
because of the 2-dimensional nature of the click-point data. We 
instead applied point pattern analysis from spatial statistics [8] to 
measure the occurrence of hotspots and to evaluate whether click-
points from the current PCCP study largely avoided hotspots 
established in the PassPoints-field study. We used the R 
programming language for statistical analysis and the spatstat 
package [1] to conduct our analysis. 
To measure the level of clustering of click-points within datasets 
(the formation of hotspots), we used the J-function [26] statistic 
from spatial analysis. The J-function combines nearest-neighbour 
calculations and empty-space measures for a given radius r in 
order to measure the clustering of points. A result of J closer to 0 
indicates that all of the data points cluster at the exact same 
coordinates, J = 1 indicates that the dataset is randomly dispersed, 
and J > 1 shows that the dataset is uniformly distributed. Ideally, 
we want the results to be near 1, indicating that the click-points are 
nearly indistinguishable from randomly generated points. Figure 9 
and Figure 10 show that click-points on the Pool and Cars images 
are more randomly dispersed for PCCP than the other three 
datasets, indicating that the persuasive viewport was successful at 
guiding users to select more random click-points. 
We further looked at the J-function measures at r = 9 pixels for the 
set of 17 core images. A radius of 9 approximates the size of the 
tolerance squares (19x19 pixels) used to determine whether a click 
was correct during password re-entry. Figure 11 shows that PCCP 
approaches complete spatial randomness for all 17 images (near J 
= 1) and is much more random than the CCP (t(15) = 9.85, p < 
.0001) and PassPoints-lab (t(15) = 11.70, p < .0001) datasets. A 
line graph was used for clarity, but in reality these are 
discontinuous points. 
The Cross J function [27] is a multivariate summary statistic 
measuring the interaction between two spatial datasets. We use it 
as a measure of whether the PCCP click-points differ from those 
collected in previous click-based graphical password studies.  
Cross J close to 0 indicates that the two datasets are taken from the 
same population, Cross J = 1 shows that the datasets are distinct, 
and Cross J > 1 means that the datasets “repulse” each other. 
Figure 12 shows the Cross J values comparing each of the lab 
studies to PassPoints-field for the Pool image. The values for 
 
 
Figure 9: J-function showing amount of clustering at different 
radius values measured in pixels for PCCP, CCP, PassPoints-
lab, and PassPoints-field on the Pool image.  
 
 
Figure 10: J-function showing amount of clustering at different 
radius values measured in pixels for PCCP, CCP, PassPoints-
lab, and PassPoints-field on the Cars image 
 
Figure 11: J-function at r=9 pixels for the set of 17 core images 
 
 
Figure 12: Cross J-function comparing PCCP, CCP, and 
PassPoints-lab to PassPoints-field reference dataset for the Pool 
image. PCCP is most dissimilar. 
 
   
PCCP are approaching 1, indicating that the PCCP dataset is 
distinct from the PassPoints-field reference set. Similar results 
were found for the Cars image.  As results for PCCP are closest to 
1, the Cross J function supports the assertion that the PCCP 
dataset is most dissimilar (among the three lab datasets) to our 
reference dataset of PassPoints-field. 
5.4. User opinion and perception  
A subset of the final questionnaire is reported here. The selected 
10-point Likert-scale questions correspond to those reported in the 
previously cited studies [3, 5]. Users rated PCCP favourably 
(Table 4), with all median responses neutral or higher. They felt 
that PCCP passwords were easy to create and quick to enter, but 
they remained impartial on their preference between text and 
graphical passwords. Some of the questions were inverted to avoid 
bias (identified with a *). The scores for those questions were 
reversed prior to calculating the means and medians, thus higher 
scores always indicate more positive results for PCCP in Table 4 
Table 4: Questionnaire responses. Scores are out of 10. The 
statements in parentheses provide the equivalent meaning for 
the reversed statement)  
Question Mean Median 
1. I could easily create a graphical 
password 8.0 8.0 
2. * Someone who knows me would be 
better at guessing my graphical password 
than a stranger (i.e., when reversed: 
“someone who knows me would not be 
any more likely to guess my password 
than a stranger”) 
7.0 8.0 
3. Logging on using a graphical password 
was easy 6.4 7.0 
4. Graphical passwords are easy to 
remember 6.0 6.0 
5. * I prefer text passwords to graphical 
passwords (i.e., when reversed: “I like 
graphical passwords at least as much as 
text passwords”) 
4.9 5.0 
6. * Text passwords are more secure than 
graphical passwords  (i.e., when 
reversed: “Graphical passwords are at 
least as secure as text passwords”) 
6.2 6.0 
7. I think that other people would choose 
different points than me for a graphical 
password 
7.2 7.0 
8. With practice, I could quickly enter my 
graphical password 8.3 8.0 
 
We compared the two security-related questions (2 and 6) to the 
previous CCP responses to see if PCCP participants felt that their 
passwords were more secure. A Mann-Whitney (U) test was used 
to compare the sets of Likert-scale responses since they are 
comprised of ordered categorical data.  The responses show that 
PCCP participants felt that their password would be equally 
difficult to guess for strangers or someone who knew them, while 
CCP participants were unsure (mean = 5.5, median = 5.0) (U = 
675, p < .005). This may indicate that PCCP participants felt that 
their password did not contain personally identifiable 
characteristics, Also, PCCP participants felt that graphical 
passwords were at least as secure as text passwords while CCP 
participants were unsure (mean = 5.1, median = 5.0) (U= 723, 
p<.05). 
It appears that users were aware that the viewport was helping to 
create more secure passwords and that the passwords were more 
random (i.e., less based on personal user choice). Several 
commented during the session that they were avoiding certain 
points because they were too obvious or too likely to be chosen by 
someone else and that the viewport was useful for helping them 
select a better click-point than they would have selected on their 
own. We speculate that in these cases users may be forming a 
more accurate mental model of the graphical password system and 
learning how to create stronger passwords. More research is 
needed to confirm this shift in users’ mental models. 
5.5. Validation of hypotheses 
We now revisit our hypotheses to evaluate whether to accept or 
reject them in light of the data analysis. 
1. Users will be less likely to select click-points that fall into 
known hotspots when using the persuasive viewport. 
Hypothesis supported: This was confirmed by using known 
hotspots from the PassPoints-field data to attack the PCCP 
and CCP datasets. Click-points were significantly less 
predictable for PCCP (recall Figure 7 for Pool and Figure 8 
for Cars), indicating that they did not fall within known 
hotspots. 
The Cross J-function results also provide statistical evidence 
that the PCCP dataset is distinct from the PassPoints-field 
dataset. 
2. The click-point distribution across users will be more 
randomly dispersed and will not form new hotspots. 
Hypothesis supported: The results of the J-function tests 
show that the PCCP dataset is more random (less clustered) 
than the previous PassPoints-lab, PassPoints-field and CCP 
datasets. 
3. The login success rates will be similar to those of the original 
CCP system. 
Hypothesis partially supported:  The login success rates are 
slightly lower with PCCP, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. It may be that PCCP click-points 
require slightly more practice before being successfully 
memorised. Given that they avoid hotspots, it intuitively 
makes sense that less obvious areas of an image may require 
more attention to memorise. It may also be that since the 
image is initially dimmed during password creation, users 
had less chance to initially memorise the location of their 
point in reference to the remainder of the image. However, 
the learning curve appears acceptable as 99% of trials 
eventually ended with a successful login.  
4. Participants will feel that their passwords are more secure 
with PCCP than participants of the original CCP system. 
Hypothesis supported:  The questionnaire results show that 
PCCP participants felt that graphical passwords were at least 
as secure as text passwords and felt that their password was 
less personal because they believed that someone who knew 
them was no more likely to guess their password than a 
stranger.  
6. DISCUSSION 
Graphical passwords have some drawbacks as a form of 
authentication. They are susceptible to shoulder-surfing (i.e., when 
it is possible to observe or record someone entering their password 
to gain some or all of the details necessary to log in to their 
account). There is also some concern about interference [3] when 
users have to remember multiple graphical passwords. However, 
graphical passwords do offer an excellent environment for 
exploring strategies for helping users select better passwords since 
it is easy to compare user choices. 
A common goal in authentication systems is to maximise the size 
of the effective password space. When user choice is involved, 
this also becomes a usability issue since users will be responsible 
for selecting their password. We have shown that it is possible to 
allow user choice while still increasing the effective password 
space. Furthermore, tools such as PCCP’s viewport are only used 
during password creation so they cannot be exploited during an 
attack on an existing account. We could further deter users from 
selecting obvious click-points by limiting the number of shuffles 
allowed during the creation of a password or by progressively 
slowing system response in repositioning the viewport with every 
shuffle past a certain threshold. These approaches present a 
middle-ground between insecure but memorable user-chosen 
passwords and secure system-generated random passwords that 
are difficult for users to remember. While user choice is 
constrained with PCCP, the low number of shuffles indicates that 
users were willing to accept the system’s suggestions and we 
believe that this design decision is justified by the increased 
security it offered and the apparently minimal usability drawbacks. 
Providing instructions on how to create secure passwords, using 
password managers, or providing tools such as strength-meters to 
gauge the strength of a password have had only limited success 
[10]. The problem with such tools is that they require additional 
effort on the part of users who are creating passwords and often 
provide little useful feedback to guide the user’s actions. In PCCP, 
creating a more secure password (by selecting a click-point within 
the first system-suggested viewport position) is the easiest course 
of action and requires little cognitive effort. Users still make a 
choice but they are constrained in their selection. Simplification 
and creating a path-of-least-resistance are both recommended 
strategies in Persuasive Technology for encouraging users to 
behave in the desired manner. PCCP demonstrates one possible 
application of Persuasive Technology [11,12] but other strategies 
could also be applied, even for graphical passwords. 
The idea of guiding users during password selection can be 
extended beyond graphical passwords and we have some evidence 
that it would be useful in increasing the effective password space 
of text passwords as well. An analogous system to PCCP for text 
password might use a “hangman” or “Wheel-of-Fortune” strategy 
where new passwords are seeded with a few randomly assigned 
characters and users must fill in the remaining characters. For 
example, the system could offer  
_ _ ! _ 9Q _ _ 
as a starting point. Here, the !, 9, and Q are fixed characters and 
users must choose the remaining characters of their password. 
Users could shuffle to get new randomly positioned and chosen 
characters if they were unable to create a password using the 
current suggestion. Such a system would reduce the occurrence of 
weak passwords consisting solely of dictionary or common words 
and would limit password re-use since any new password would 
also contain random characters. We expect that these passwords 
would be more memorable than system-assigned passwords since 
the user could personalise the password to some extent and would 
be engaging in its creation, which should help with memorisation. 
Initial pilot testing of such a system revealed that this particular 
approach may make it too difficult for users to create their 
passwords. They resorted to predictable patterns such as repeating 
the system-assigned characters. For example, a likely password for 
_ _ ! _ 9Q _ _ would be !!!99QQQ  [13].   
Instead, we allowed users to create their password normally then 
the system inserted a few random characters in random positions 
within the password. For example, if their original password was 
“fluffy”, the strengthened password may become “f2luffRy”. 
Users could shuffle to find a combination that seemed suitable, but 
again shuffling required time and effort. Users saw their modified 
password and re-entered it with the additional characters. Lab 
results indicate that this may be a viable approach [13] because the 
passwords are mostly user-created and the extra random characters 
increase their security. We speculate that users were able to 
visualize and remember their password in “chunks” with the 
inserted characters in between these chunks [14]. However, the 
more interesting question is whether the resulting passwords 
would be sufficiently memorable for long-term practical use. We 
cannot at present answer this question.  
Another often cited goal of usable security is helping users form 
accurate mental models of security. Through questionnaires and 
conversations with participants in authentication usability studies, 
it is apparent that in general, users have little understanding of 
what makes a good password and how to best protect themselves 
online. Furthermore, even those who are more knowledgeable 
usually admit to behaving insecurely (such as re-using passwords 
or providing personal information online even though they are 
unsure about the security of a website) because it is more 
convenient and because they do not fully understand the possible 
consequences of their actions. 
We believe that guiding users in making more secure choices, 
such as using the viewport during graphical password selection, 
can help foster more accurate mental models of security. Rather 
than providing vague instructions such as “pick a password no one 
will guess”, we are actively showing users how to select a more 
random password as they perform the task.  
Although these initial results are promising, further work is 
needed to test the long-term memorability of PCCP passwords, 
test the effect of interference when users must remember multiple 
passwords, and observe user behaviour in a real-world setting.  A 
field study where participants use PCCP passwords instead of text 
passwords to access online resources over a few months (similar 
to [3] ) would provide insight into these issues.  
7. CONCLUSION 
An important usability and security goal in authentication systems 
is to help users select better passwords and thus increase the 
effective password space. We believe that users can be persuaded 
to select stronger passwords through better user interface design. 
As an example, we designed Persuasive Cued Click-Points 
(PCCP) and conducted a usability study to evaluate its 
effectiveness. We obtained favourable results both for usability 
and security. 
   
Graphical passwords provide a useful environment for testing such 
approaches because it is easier to determine the similarity of 
passwords and hence test for characteristics such as the occurrence 
of hotspots. However, we believe that these ideas could be 
adopted for text passwords as well, helping to increase the 
effective password space by encouraging users to behave more 
securely.  
PCCP encourages and guides users in selecting more random 
click-based graphical passwords. A key feature in PCCP is that 
creating a secure password is the “path-of-least-resistance”, 
making it likely to be more effective than schemes where 
behaving securely adds an extra burden on users. The approach 
has proven effective at reducing the formation of hotspots and 
avoiding known hotspots, thus increasing the effective password 
space, while still maintaining usability.  
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